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SMITH, Chief Judge. 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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A Utah state court sentenced Mark Tingey to 300 days in jail and three years of 
probation for possessing child pornography.  After Tingey was released from jail, and 
after he promised not to view pornography while on probation, the court allowed him to 
serve that probation, and be supervised, in Philadelphia so that he could be with his wife. 
But six months into Tingey’s probation, agents found signs of porn on his computer. So 
Pennsylvania probation officer Dage Gardner requested Tingey report to his parole 
officer as a result of violating the terms of his probation.  
Tingey admitted the violation and relinquished his right to a hearing. He served 
two months in a halfway house for the violation.  
Despite his earlier admission, Tingey now contends there was no porn on his 
computer so that Gardner lacked probable cause to arrest him. He also claims that 
Gardner coerced him into admitting the violation, so his two-month detention shocks the 
conscience. He sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, bringing a false imprisonment claim and a 
substantive due process claim against Gardner and his supervisor, plus a supervisory 
liability claim against the supervisor.  
As the District Court correctly concluded,1 all three claims fail. 
* 
 
1 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367, awarding 
Gardner and his supervisor summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 
See No. 17-827, 2019 WL 6828638 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2019). We have jurisdiction over 
Tingey’s timely appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and review the District Court’s judgment 
de novo. See Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 609 (3d Cir. 2018). 
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First, Tingey’s false imprisonment claim runs aground at two places. For starters, 
Tingey’s complaint alleges only the intentional tort of false imprisonment under 
Pennsylvania law. See App. 15 ¶ 40 (alleging “Defendants maliciously, intentionally, 
recklessly and/or willfully caused the false arrest and imprisonment of the plaintiff . . . in 
violation of state law” but never mentioning the U.S. Constitution or the Fourth 
Amendment (emphasis added)). Yet Pennsylvania has not waived its sovereign immunity 
from intentional torts against state officers like Gardner. See Kull v. Guisse, 81 A.3d 148, 
157 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013). 
And even if we read Tingey’s complaint to allege a parallel Fourth Amendment 
violation, it would smack into Heck v. Humphrey’s favorable-termination rule. See 512 
U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (“[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional 
conviction or imprisonment . . . a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or 
sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared 
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question 
by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus . . . .”). In other words, because 
Tingey has not successfully challenged the underlying probation violation, he cannot 
bring a Fourth Amendment claim. See also Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 177-78 
(3d Cir. 2006) (holding Heck precluded a parolee’s § 1983 claim alleging his parole 
officer lacked probable cause to seize him for a parole violation because the parolee 
hadn’t successfully challenged the parole violation). 
*      * 
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Second, his substantive due process claim fails three times over. For one, Tingey 
cabins his substantive due process claim to his halfway-house detention after admitting 
the probation violation.  So any liability for events during that detention would fall to the 
halfway house—not to Gardner, who lacked personal involvement with Tingey’s 
detention. See Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (reiterating that 
individual defendants must be personally involved in the alleged wrongdoing to face civil 
rights liability). Strike one. 
What’s more, even if we accept Gardner as the proper defendant, what allegedly 
happened here—two months of halfway-house detention after admitting a probation 
violation—hardly shocks the conscience. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 
833, 847-49 (1998) (noting that “the substantive component of the Due Process Clause is 
violated by executive action only when it ‘can properly be characterized as . . . 
conscience shocking’” and that conduct “[]justifiable by any government interest” is not 
conscience-shocking (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128 
(1992))). Strike two. 
And at all events, Gardner’s substantive due process claim crashes into the more-
specific-provision rule. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997) (“[I]f a 
constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth 
or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that 
specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process.”). Tingey’s due 
process claim characterizes his halfway-house detention as “arbitrary,” “violat[ing] the 
decency of civilized conduct,” “malicious,” and “deliberate[ly] indifferen[t] to [his] right 
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to liberty and well being.” App. 16 ¶¶ 44–47. But those characterizations could just as 
easily support an Eighth Amendment claim. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII. (prohibiting 
cruel and unusual punishments). So because Tingey’s substantive due process claim 
could be repackaged under a more specific constitutional provision, it is “not cognizable 
under the Due Process Clause.” DeLade v. Cargan, No. 19-1908, 2020 WL 5001788, *4, 
__ F.3d __ (3d Cir. Aug. 25, 2020). Strike three. 
*      *      * 
Finally, Tingey’s supervisory liability claim doesn’t even make it to the starting 
gate. His opening brief devotes just a single paragraph (seven lines, fifty-eight words) to 
the issue, citing no authority and including no substantive argument besides a conclusory 
“[f]or the above stated reasons” sentence. Appellant Br. 40; see also Reply Br. (failing to 
mention supervisory liability at all). That “passing reference” does “not suffice to bring 
th[is] issue before this court.” Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am. v. Foster Wheeler Energy 
Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 
F.2d 1042, 1066 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
And even if we excused that “abandon[ment] and waive[r],” Ghana v. Holland, 
226 F.3d 175, 180 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3df Cir. 
1993)), as the District Court correctly observed, because Tingey suffered no 
constitutional injury, there can be no supervisory liability. See 2019 WL 6828638, at *6 
(citing A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 
2004)). 
*      *      *      * 
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We will affirm. 
